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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
MICHAEL SHAWN CASEY, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 20010622-SC 
Priority No. 13 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
* * * 
STATEiMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in 
State v. Casey, 2001 UT App 205, 29 P.3d 25 (reproduced in Addendum A). The Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The sole issue on certiorari is whether attempted murder under the intentional or 
knowing alternative of the murder statute is a cognizable offense under Utah law. 
Standard of Review. On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision 
for correctness, giving its conclusions of law no deference. State v. James, 2000 UT 80, <] 
8, 13 P.3d 576. Whether Utah recognizes an intentional or knowing attempted murder is a 
matter of statutory interpretation reviewed for correctness. Cf. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 
1 
844 (Utah 1992) (holding that whether Utah recognizes attempted depraved indifference 
homicide is a matter of statutory interpretation reviewed for correctness). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1999) is relevant to a determination 
of this case. That section provides: 
Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial 
step toward commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them 
to be. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and domestic 
violence in the presence of a child. R. 34-35. Defendant was also charged with enhanced 
penalties on each count for use of a dangerous weapon in the commission of the crimes. R. 
34-35. After holding a preliminary hearing, a magistrate bound defendant over for trial. R. 
230: 109-10. Following a two-day trial, a jury found defendant guilty on all three counts as 
charged, including the enhanced penalties. R. 67, 70-71, 76-77, 112-14, 231-33. Defendant 
was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of one-to- fifteen years for attempted murder and 
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zero-to-five years each for aggravated assault and domestic violence. R. 189-90. The court 
also imposed a firearm enhancement penalty of one year on the murder conviction and zero-
to-five years each on the aggravated assault and domestic violence convictions. R. 191. 
Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that (1) the trial court improperly instructed the 
jury on the mens rea element of attempted murder, and (2) the aggravated assault charge was 
a lesser included offense ofthe murder charge. R. 142-44,168. After hearing argument, the 
trial court denied the motion. R. 192-96. 
Defendant appealed the trial court's rulings on his motion for a new trial, but the court 
of appeals affirmed. Casey, 2001 UT App205. This Court granted defendant's petition for 
certiorari review, which challenges only the court of appeals' holding that Utah recognizes 
the crime of attempted murder under the "intentional or knowing" alternative of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-5-203(l)(a) (1999). See Casey, 2001 UT App 205, at TJ 27. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
In April 1999, defendant threatened to kill Tresa Franz as he pointed a loaded gun at 
her in a parked car; her four-year-old boy Quincy was sitting in the backseat. R. 232: 146-47, 
195, 205.l The argument continued as defendant drove down a residential street. Again, he 
pointed the gun at Franz's head, this time pulling the trigger. R. 232: 151, 206-07; see also 
R. 233:315-16,322,363. Fortunately, the gun did not fire. R.232: 151, 153; R. 233: 316. 
* * * 
Only those facts that are relevant to the issues presented are included. The facts 
are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 
337, 339 (Utah 1997). 
Defendant and Franz were involved in a turbulent relationship, an on-again off-again 
romance lasting several months. See R. 232: 139-40,165, 187-88; R. 233:462-66,473,484-
85. About a week after one of the couple's break-ups, defendant and his friend Terron Allred 
drove to Franz's home where the three drank alcohol. R. 232: 135-37, 164-65, 170, 174-75, 
238-39. Eventually, Allred, Franz, and Franz's four-year-old son Quincy left with defendant. 
R. 232: 136, 170; R. 233: 309, 489, 497. After defendant ran an errand, he drove around 
somemore, stopping at a liquor store to buy more alcohol. R. 232: 137-39, 170, 175-76; see 
also R. 233: 492-93, 498, 501. Although Franz and Allred each had a swig of the rum, 
defendant drank more than half. See R. 232: 137-38, 175-76; R. 233: 310, 400-01. 
Intoxicated from the alcohol he had consumed that day, defendant became vulgar and 
belligerent toward Franz. R. 232: 138-41, 167, 176. When she asked that he take her home, 
defendant refused, laughing at her and threatening to kill her. R. 232: 140-41; R. 233: 492. 
Instead, defendant drove to a friend's house and spoke with several people there while 
Allred, Franz, and Quincy waited in the car. R. 232: 142-45, 170-72, 240-42, 247-48, 260-
61-63, 285-86; R. 233: 311-12, 340, 467-69, 503. When defendant returned to the car, he 
told Allred to get out R. 232: 145, 176, 205, 263, 286; R. 233: 340, 496; see also R. 233: 
471. 
After Allred left the car, defendant and Franz began a heated argument. R. 232: 146, 
248-49, 264, 286-87; R. 233: 472, 503. Before stepping into the car, defendant reached 
behind the seat and pulled out a loaded handgun from his camera bag, keeping it concealed 
from Franz's view. R. 232: 146, 177, 194; R. 233: 364. When Franz asked if he was ready 
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to go home, defendant declared, 4;F you, bitch. I'm going to take you home all right" 
R. 232: 146-47, 205. Defendant then took the gun and pointed it at Franz's neck. R. 232: 
147, 195. Franz pleaded with defendant not to shoot her because her baby was in the car. 
R. 232: 147. Hearing the argument and witnessing defendant point the gun at Franz, Tiffany 
Ribe, who was talking with Allred, walked over to the car and told them they needed to 
leave. R. 232: 147, 195, 249-54, 264, 266-70, 276, 279-80, 287. Allred got back in the car, 
and after defendant put the gun down and agreed to go, Tiffany returned to the house. R. 
232:149,251,254-55,267,271,276. 
After Tiffany returned to the house, Franz fled into the house, only to return two or 
three minutes later after realizing that her son was still in the car. R. 232: 149, 195, 254-55, 
271, 288; R. 233: 314-15, 345, 474. After a brief pause in the argument, defendant again 
threatened Franz and rebuked her efforts to appease him. See R. 232: 150-51, 255. At that 
point, Tiffany's uncle emerged from the basement and told defendant to leave. See R. 232: 
200,255-56,274; R. 233:347. Defendant apologized, backed out of the driveway, and drove 
down the street. R. 232: 206, 256, 274, 289; R. 233: 347-48, 506. 
Before reaching the end of the block, defendant again pointed the gun at Franz's face, 
but this time pulled the trigger. R. 232: 151, 206-07; see also R. 233:315-16, 322, 363. The 
gun misfired, failing to discharge. R. 232: 151, 153; R. 233: 316. Defendant then 
successfully fired the gun at Franz's feet, but the bullet missed Franz and lodged in the 
floorboard. R. 232: 153-54; R. 233: 323, 368, 402-03; see also R. 233: 511. Defendant 
pushed the barrel of the gun up to Franz's head, but before he could pull the trigger, Franz 
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pushed defendant's arm into the air and jumped out of the moving truck. R. 232: 154, 208-
10, 212; R. 233: 389, 479-80; .see also R. 233: 324. As she jumped from the car, the gun 
discharged a second time. R. 232: 154; R. 233: 317. During the altercation, at least three 
shots were successfully fired, one of which accidentally hit defendant's hand. R. 233: 323-
25,352,367,512. 
The gun used by defendant was later found, together with four shell casings and one 
unspent round, in a hall way storage unit near Alfred's apartment. R. 233: 369-75,417, 419. 
Testing revealed that the unspent round had misfired from defendant's gun and that all four 
shell casings had been discharged from his gun. R. 233: 443-45. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the court of appeals erred in concluding that attempted murder 
is a cognizable offense under the "intentional or knowing" alternative of the murder statute. 
He contends that State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992), effectively overruled State v. 
Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982), which recognized that crime. Although Vigil rejected 
one of the two rationales upon which Maestas relied in reaching its decision, it did not 
overrule the ultimate holding—that Utah recognizes the crime of attempted murder under the 
"intentional or knowing" alternative. Accordingly, Vigil noted that "Maestas is still good law 
insofar as it authorizes prosecution for . . . attempted murder under the intentional or 
knowing formulation" of the murder statute. Vigil, 842 P.2d at 848 n.5. Contrary to 
defendant's claim, that statement does not constitute dicta, but appropriately limits the reach 
of the Vigil holding. Because defendant has not challenged the second rationale upon which 
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the Maestas court relied, this Court has no alternative but to reject his claim and affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
Moreover, when read according to the fair import of its terms, the murder statute treats 
the "intentional" and "knowing" mental states under the first alternative theory of murder as 
functional equivalents. A showing that a defendant knowingly caused the death of another 
is the functional equivalent of a showing that defendant intentionally caused the death of 
another. The attempt statute, as applied to the "intentional or knowing" alternative, should 
be read similarly. Such an approach is consistent with the fair import of the statute's terms, 
the Model Penal Code, and decisions of other courts. 
Finally, even if the trial court erred in instructing the jury under the "intentional or 
knowing" alternative, any such error is harmless. Defendant told Ms. Franz that he intended 
to kill her. He pulled the trigger of a loaded gun while pointing it at her face. Fortunately, 
it did not fire. He again pointed the gun at Ms. Franz's face, but she pushed his arm up into 
the air before he pulled the trigger. In all, defendant successfully fired the gun at least three 
times. Under these circumstances, the jury could not avoid finding that defendant intended 
to kill Ms. Franz. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT UTAH 
LAW RECOGNIZES THE CRIME OF ATTEMPTED MURDER UNDER 
THE "INTENTIONAL OR KiNOWING" ALTERNATIVE 
On certiorari, defendant challenges the court of appeals' holding that an attempt to 
commit murder under the "intentional or knowing" alternative of the murder statute does not 
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require a mental state greater than "knowing." Pet. Brf. at 7-15. Contrary to defendant's 
claim, the court of appeals correctly decided the issue. 
A. VIGIL DID N O T OVERRULE MAESTAS. 
On certiorari, defendant contends that this Court's decision in State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 
843 (Utah 1992), is dispositive. Pet. Brf. at 7. His petition asserts that Vigil effectively 
overruled this Court's decision in State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982), which held 
that Utah law recognizes the offense of attempted murder under the "intentional or knowing" 
alternative of the murder statute. See Pet. Brf. at 7-15. Defendant's claim is not supported 
by the text of Vigil. 
1. Overview: State v. Maestas. 
Like defendant here, Maestas argued that a stronger showing of intent than that 
required for an "intentional or knowing" murder was necessary to sustain a conviction for 
attempted murder. Maestas, 652 P.2d at 904.2 The Utah Supreme Court rejected that claim, 
holding that Utah law recognizes the crime of attempted murder for "intentionally or 
knowingly' attempting to cause the death of another. Id. at 904-05 (emphasis added). 
Maestas argued that the attempt statute should be interpreted in a manner consistent 
with the common law crime of attempted murder, which, he alleged, makes "intent [ ] a 
necessary element of every 'attempt' crime even where the corresponding completed crime 
2Unlike defendant here, Maestas was charged with aggravated murder, which, like 
the first alternative under the murder statute, requires a showing that the defendant 
intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another. See Maestas, 652 P.2d at 903-04; 
compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1) (1999) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1 )(a) 
(1999). 
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does not require intent as an element." See id. at 904. The Court rejected this contention on 
two grounds. 
First, this Court observed that because Utah's criminal code has abolished all common 
law crimes, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (1999), it was not bound by the common law 
interpretation of criminal offenses, but was at liberty to construe cnminal statutes "liberally[,] 
even when they conflict with the common law." Maestas, 652 P.2d at 904. After so noting, 
the Court turned to the language in subsection (1) requiring a showing that the defendant 
"act[ ] with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense/' 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1). The court concluded that section 76-1 -401 does not impose 
intent as an element of every attempt, but "requires only 'the kind of culpability,'" meaning 
mental state, '"otherwise required for the commission of the [completed] offense.'" Maestas, 
652 P.2d at 904 {quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1)) (brackets in original). 
As a second basis for its decision, the Court turned to an analysis of the common law. 
The Court concluded that even if the common law rule of attempt governed the Court's 
interpretation of the statute, it "would not require the result urged by defendant." Id. at 905. 
The Court explained: 
Th[e] rule [that intent is a necessary element of every attempt] differentiates 
between the intent requirements for an attempted and a completed crime only 
where the completed crime may be committed without the intent to commit that 
crime in particular, as in the case of felony murder. Where an intent to 
commit the particular crime is an element of the completed crime, the same 
intent requirement applies to the corresponding 'attempt' crime, even at 
common law. Thus, Utah's first degree murder statute, which does contain 
such an intent requirement, would not fall within the rule cited by defendant 
even under common law principles. 
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Id. (emphasis added). 
2. Overview: State v. Vigil. 
Ten years later in Vigil, this Court re-examined Utah's attempt statute, focusing on the 
effect of subsection (2), which provides that "conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-101 (2). The Court concluded that subsection (2) "limit[s] the attempt statute to 
offenses with a mental state of 'intent.'" Id. at 846. The Court reasoned that, contrary to its 
decision in Maestas, the "culpability" referred to in subsection (1) refers not to the actor's 
mental state, but "to the attendant circumstances, if any, of the underlying offense." Vigil, 
842 P.2d at 845-46. Thus, Vigil rejected the first of the two rationales upon which the 
Maestas decision rested, holding that it was "incorrect" and "inconsistent" with its decisions 
in Vigil and other cases. Id. at 848 n.5.3 
Nevertheless, the Vigil court left undisturbed the central holding of Maestas—that 
Utah law recognizes the crime of attempted murder under the "intentional or knowing" 
:The Vigil court opined that the "culpability" rationale relied on in Maestas 
conflicted with its decisions refusing to recognize attempted reckless manslaughter and 
attempted murder under the felony murder alternative. Vigil, 842 P.2d at 847-48 & n.5; 
see State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 393 (Utah 1989) (holding that "[t]he crime of attempted 
murder does not fit within the felony-murder doctrine because an attempt to commit a 
crime requires proof of an intent to consummate the crime"); State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 
237, 239 (Utah 1978) (holding that an attempt under reckless manslaughter is not 
cognizable because that alternative simply requires the mental state of recklessness, 
whereas ;i[a]n attempt to commit a crime is an act done with the intent to commit that 
crime"); see also State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 94 (Utah 1982) (recognizing the crime of 
attempted manslaughter under the imperfect legal justification alternative because the 
killing must be intentional). 
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alternative of the murder statute. Id. at 848 n.5. Although it rejected Maestas 's culpability 
rationale, the Vigil court expressly "note[d] that Maestas is still good law insofar as it 
authorizes prosecution for attempted aggravated murder under the intentional or knowing 
formulation of section 76-5-202(1) or attempted murder under the intentional or knowing 
formulation of section 76-5-203(1 )(a)." Id (emphasis added). 
3. Vigil Left Undisturbed the Holding in Maestas. 
Vigil's footnote reaffirming Maestas's holding as to an attempted murder requiring 
a mental state of "intentional or knowing" is, according to defendant, mere dicta. Pet. Brf. 
at 14-15. To the contrary, that footnote serves to limit the scope of the Court's holding to the 
propriety of applying the attempt statute to the depraved indifference alternative of the 
murder statute. In other words, although its underlying rationale undercut one of the two 
rationales relied on in Maestas, Vigil does not purport to address the ultimate holding in 
Maestas—that attempted murder under the intentional or knowing alternative is a cognizable 
offense in Utah. As the court of appeals properly concluded below, Casey, 2001 UT App 
205, at ^J14, the Vigil decision was expressly limited to the "narrow" issue of "whether proof 
of the 'knowing' mental state required for depraved indifference homicide under section 76-
5-203(1 )(c) of the Code is sufficient to satisfy the mental state required by Utah's attempt 
statute found in section 76-4-101." Vigil, 842 P.2d at 844 (emphasis added). Vigil held that 
it is not, concluding that "the crime of attempted depraved indifference homicide does not 
exist in Utah." Id. at 844-48. Vigil reaches no further. 
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As the court of appeals below observed, "[i]f the [Vigil] court intended to eliminate 
attempted 'knowing' murders under the 'intentional or knowing' alternative, instead of 
writing that 'Maestas is still good law insofar as it authorizes prosecution for . . . attempted 
murder under the intentional or knowing formulation of section 76-5-203(1 )(a),' the [Vigil] 
court could have simply written that Maestas is still good law insofar as it authorizes 
attempted 'intentional' murders under section 76-5-203(l)(a)." Casey, 2001 UT App 205, 
at f^ 14 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). 
Because Vigil did not overrule Maestas, defendant's claim on certiorari must fail. 
Defendant has not challenged the second rationale upon which the Maestas court relied, 
either on direct appeal or on certiorari. Having failed to do so, this Court has no alternative 
but to reject his claim and affirm the decision of the court of appeals. See Coulter & Smith, 
Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998) (holding that review on certiorari is limited 
by the issues raised in the petition). 
B. THE MURDER STATUTE TREATS "INTENTIONAL" AND "KNOWING" AS 
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENTS. 
Even if this Court were to re-visit the ultimate holding in Maestas, Utah's attempt 
statute as applied to the "intentional or knowing" alternative of the murder statute is fairly 
read to recognize the crime of attempted murder for attempting to "intentionally or 
knowingly" cause the death of another. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1999) (providing 
that criminal statutes are not to be strictly construed, but "according to the fair import of their 
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terms to promotejustice and to effect the objects of the law — " ) ; accord Maestas, 652 P.2d 
at 904 (observing that criminal statutes are to be construed liberally). 
An understanding of the attempt statute, as applied to the murder statute, first requires 
an understanding of the murder statute itself. Under section 76-5-203, a person who causes 
the death of another is guilty of murder if he or she does so: 
(1) "intentionally or knowingly;" 
(2) "intending to cause serious bodily injury to another" while acting in 
a manner "clearly dangerous to human life;" 
(3) "under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human 
life" and his or her conduct "creates a grave risk of death to another;" 
(4) "while in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight 
from the commission or attempted commission o f certain enumerated 
felonies; or 
(5) "recklessly" while assaulting a peace officer or forcefully interfering 
with a peace officer making a lawful arrest or in an attempt thereof and the 
peace officer dies. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (1999).4 The legislature has thus demarcated five alternative 
theories of murder, distinguished by separate mental states of varying degree dependent upon 
the circumstances surrounding the homicide. Reckless murder of an officer requires a 
showing that the perpetrator acted recklessly. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1 )(e); State 
v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1350-51 (Utah 1997). Felony murder only requires proof of the 
4The murder statute lists two other circumstances constituting murder, but each is 
simply a reduction from aggravated murder based on specified conditions. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1 )(0 (reducing aggravated murder where an enumerated 
affirmative defense is shown) & § 76-5-203( l)(g) (reducing aggravated murder where 
special mitigation is established). 
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mens rea associated with the underlying felony; no mental state is required as to the homicide 
itself. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1 )(d); State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, H 25, 438 Utah 
Adv. Rep 39. Depraved indifference murder requires a showing that the perpetrator "knew 
his or her conduct created a grave risk of death to another." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
203(1 )(c); Vigil, 842 P.2d at 844. Serious bodily injury murder requires a showing that the 
perpetrator intended to cause serious bodily injury in committing an act that was clearly 
dangerous to human life. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1 )(b). Finally, intentional murder 
requires a showing that the perpetrator acted intentionally or knowingly. See Utah Code 
Ann. §76-5-203(l)(a). 
In Vigil, the State argued that because each of the murder alternatives was subject to 
the same punishment, the mental states of each should be treated as equivalent to the "intent" 
required under the attempt statute. See Vigil, 842 P.2d at 847. The Court rejected the State's 
argument, concluding that the lesser mental states identified in the other murder alternatives 
could not be read to mean purposeful intent. Id. This proposition may be true as to the 
mental states corresponding to the five alternative theories of murder. However, it does not 
hold true in the case of the first alternative theory of murder which recognizes murder for 
"intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] the death of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
203(l)(a). 
As noted, the legislature separated murder into five alternative theories—distinguished 
by the differing mental states and the attendant circumstances. However, it made no 
distinction between knowingly causing death and intentionally causing death, choosing 
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instead to group those two mental states together under a single alternative. In other words, 
the two mental states are, for purposes of the statute, functionally equivalent. 
To hold otherwise, the Court would be required to in effect rewrite the statute, 
creating a sixth alternative theory of murder: one for "knowingly" causing death and another 
for "intentionally" causing death. Had the legislature intended such a result, it would have 
written the statute accordingly. Instead, it chose to treat these two mental states as functional 
equivalents by grouping them together under one alternative theory of murder. 
That the legislature intended to treat these two mental states as functional equivalents 
under the murder statute is evidenced by its approach to aggravated murder—"one of the 
most heinous acts known to society." State v. Holland, 111 P.2d 1019, 1028 (Utah 1989). 
Aggravated murder subjects the guilty to death, the ultimate and most severe of all 
punishments. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(2) (1999). Accordingly, persons guilty of 
murder under the latter four alternatives of the murder statute, e.g., serious bodily injury 
murder, depraved indifference murder, felony murder, and reckless murder of an officer, are 
not subject to prosecution for aggravated murder even if the aggravating circumstances 
identified in the aggravated murder statute are present. Only those who "intentionally or 
knowingly cause[] the death of another"—the first alternative theory of murder, are subject 
to prosecution for aggravated murder if the aggravators are present. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
202(1). Again, the legislature chose to group the two mental states together, rather than 
treating them separately—even where a defendant's life may be at stake. 
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Likewise, this Court has consistently treated a showing that the defendant 
"intentionally or knowingly" caused the death of another as an "intentional murder." For 
example, in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 569 (Utah 1987), this Court noted that the 
aggravated murder statute "explicitly requires that the actor intentionally or knowingly cause 
the death of another under any of several circumstances." However, immediately after 
making this observation, the Tillman court reiterated that "[n]o unintentional, negligent, or 
accidental killing, regardless of the circumstances, can be [aggravated] murder." Tillman, 
750 P.2d at 569 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added). In other words, Tillman makes clear that 
under the murder and aggravated murder statutes, knowingly causing the death of another 
is the functional equivalent of intentionally causing the death of another. Other decisions of 
this Court have also treated a knowing murder as the functional equivalent of an intentional 
murder. See, e.g., State v. Herrerra, 895 P.2d 359,377 (Utah 1995) (referring to aggravated 
murder and murder under the "intentional or knowing" alternative as "intentional murder"); 
State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629,658 (Utah 1995) (observing that the aggravating circumstances 
identified in the aggravated murder statute "serve to distinguish those intentional murders 
that qualify for capital punishment from those that do not"); Holland, 111 P.2d at 1028 
(referring to capital homicide as an "intentional murder"). 
Where the murder statute treats these two mental states as functional equivalents, so 
too must the attempt statute. This reading of the attempt statute is consistent with the Model 
Penal Code (MPC). This Court has observed that Utah's attempt statute "adopts the 
definition of an 'attempt' employed in the Model Penal Code, §§ 5.01, purposed on drawing 
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the line further away from the final act and enlarging the common law concept." State v. 
Pearson, 680 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1984) (per curiam). As observed in Vigil, the 
commentaries to the MPC provide that the "attempt provision requires either intentional 
conduct or the belief that the actor's conduct will result in the proscribed act." Vigil, 842 
P.2d at (Utah 1992) (citing 1 Amer.L.Inst., Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 5.01,303 
(1985)) (emphasis added). Therefore, the recognition of the crime of attempted murder for 
an intentional or knowing attempt to cause the death of another is consistent with the Model 
Penal Code after which section 76-4-101 was fashioned.^ Thus, contrary to defendant's 
claim on certiorari, see Pet. Brf. at 10-11, Vigil appears to have adopted the MPC approach 
inasmuch as it expressly refused to overrule the holding in Maestas. 
In holding that attempted murder "can be knowingly committed," the Anzona Court 
of Appeals observed that while "the drafters of the Model Penal Code agreed that there 
should be no attempt crime for negligent or reckless homicide[,] [t]he Code goes on to state: 
"When, on the other hand, a person actually believes that his behavior will 
produce the proscribed result, it is appropriate to treat him as attempting to 
cause the result, whether or not that is his purpose. 
Subsection (l)(b) provides that when causing a particular result is an element 
of the crime, as in homicide offenses . . ., an actor commits an attempt when 
he does or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing cor with the belief 
that it will cause' such result without further conduct on his part. Thus, a 
'But see Vigil, 842 P.2d at 846-47 (citing Loren Martin, Utah Criminal Code 
Outline 169 (1973)), which notes that the Utah attempt statute was also modeled after the 
1971 Proposed Federal Criminal Code, and citing 1 National Commission on Reform of 
Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of 
Federal Criminal Laws 354 & n.6, which states that the attempt provision requires 
intentional conduct). 
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belief that death will ensue from the actor's conduct. . . will suffice, as well 
as would a purpose to bring about those results. If, for example, the actor's 
purpose were to demolish a building and, knowing that persons were in the 
building and that they would be killed by the explosion, he nevertheless 
detonated a bomb that turned out to be defective, he could be prosecuted for 
attempted murder even though it was no part of his purpose that the inhabitants 
of the building would be killed." 
State v. Nunez, 769 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (An. App. 1989) {citing Model Penal Code §§ 
5.01.2, at 301 (1985)). 
Accordingly, a fair and common sense reading of the attempt and murder statutes 
leads to the conclusion that in grouping together under one alternative the acts of knowingly 
causing death and intentionally causing death, the legislature intended to create a statutory 
inference of intent upon proof that the defendant knowingly caused the death of another. 
This construction of the attempt statute is consistent with pronouncements of this Court, 
before and after Vigil. See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 642 (Utah 1997) 
(comparing the penalty for aggravated assault by a prisoner with that for "attempted murder, 
which also requires an intent to kill or a knowledge that one's acts would result in death if 
earned out"); State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1157 (Utah 1991) (upholding attempted 
murder conviction because "[t]he jury could certainly [have] inferred] from [defendant's] 
statements . . . that [defendant] administered the [poison] with the necessary intent or 
knowledge"); State v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1986) (holding that in order to 
convict defendant, "the State must have adduced evidence that would have allowed the jury 
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intentionally or knowingly attempted to 
cause [the victim's] death"). It is also consistent with decisions in other states. See, e.g., 
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Bartlett v. State, 711 N.E.2d 497, 499 (Ind. 1999) (observing that "[t]o sustain an attempted 
murder conviction, the State must prove that the defendant took a substantial step towards 
the intentional or knowing killing of another); People v. Gonzalez, 926 P.2d 153, 155 (Colo. 
App. 1996) (holding that "attempted second degree murder requires an awareness that death 
is practically certain to result"); Gentry v. State, 881 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. App. 1994) 
(holding that "[t]o convict appellant of attempted murder, the State had to prove that 
appellant intentionally or knowingly intended to cause the death of the complainant"); Nunez, 
769 P.2d at 1042-43 ("concluding] that attempted first degree murder can be knowingly 
committed"); Free v. State, 455 So.2d 137, 147 (Ala. App. 1984) (observing that 
"[attempted murder is a specific intent crime" and therefore "[o]ne must intentionally or 
knowingly attempt to commit murder"); State v. Feliciano, 618 P.2d 306, 308 (Haw. 1980) 
(holding that "[attempted murder is established when a defendant intentionally or knowingly 
attempted to cause the death of another through an act which is a substantial step in the 
course of conduct intended to culminate in the crime of murder").6 As such, the court of 
appeals correctly held that Utah law recognizes the crime of attempted murder under the 
"intentional or knowing" alternative of the murder statute. 
6Defendant has cited to several jurisdictions reaching the opposite conclusion. See 
Pet. Brf. at 11-12. However, not all those cited by defendant necessarily preclude an 
attempt under the "knowing" mental state since some indicate that specific intent includes 
knowing. See, e.g., Bartlett, 711 N.E.2d at 499 (Ind. 1999); Free, 455 So.2d at 147 (Ala. 
App. 1984) 
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C ANY ERROR IN THE INSTRUCTION IS HARMLESS, 
Even if this Court were to find that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on an 
"intentional or knowing" attempted murder, any such error would be harmless. 
1. Effect of Improper Instructions. 
Because the State bears the burden of proving the elements of an offense, the trial 
court must properly instruct the jury on the elements. See State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 
(Utah 1986); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1999). As a general rule, therefore, "[a]n 
accurate instruction upon the basic elements of the offense charged is essential, and the 
failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error." State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 
1980). However, an exception to this general rule exists where the error is shown not to be 
substantial. 
While an instruction may be incomplete or incorrect, the reviewing court can 
determine that the jury did find each of the elements of the offense and therefore any error 
is not prejudicial. See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048-1049 (Utah 1984) (reviewing 
failure to expressly treat element of knowledge in context of second degree murder 
conviction). In Fontana, this Court held that even the failure to define the mental state 
necessary for the offense may be harmless. Id. at 1048. Fontana was convicted of second-
degree murder for shooting a fellow driver in the head while driving along a Salt Lake City 
street. Id. at 1043. He argued on appeal that the jury instruction on "depraved indifference" 
required reversal because it made no reference to mental state. Id. 1044-45. This Court held 
that the applicable mental state was "knowingly, meaning 'aware of the nature of his conduct 
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or the existing circumstances . . "Id. at 1046 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2)). The 
elements instruction mentioned no mental state. Id. 
In finding no prejudice, the Court found that "[i]n the context of the other instructions 
and the evidence in this case, the jury could hardly have misunderstood that the defendant 
had to be aware that his conduct created a grave risk of death to another, as described in the 
statutory definitions contained in the instructions." Id. at 1048. "Moreover," the Court 
continued, "the jury could not have avoided finding that the defendant, an experienced 
marksman, was in fact aware of the grave risk of death to another posed by his discharging 
a .357 Magnum pistol in the circumstances described in the evidence." Id. In light of 
"[tjhese realities, in company with the fact that the defense made no request for an instruction 
on the defendant's knowledge or awareness of the grave risk of death posed by his conduct," 
the Court concluded "that any error in the omission of an express instruction on the element 
of knowledge was not prejudicial in this case." Id. 
Thus, where a reviewing court cannot determine whether the jury found all the 
elements of the offense, see State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991), or where the 
omitted element was at issue, see Laine, 618 P.2d at 35, a reviewing court cannot determine 
whether the jury found that element, and reversal is required. However, where the reviewing 
court can determine that the jury found all the elements of the offense, no prejudice—and 
therefore no manifest injustice—has occurred; this is especially so where the defendant did 
not object to the instruction assailed on appeal. See Fontana, 680 P.2d at 1098. 
21 
2. The Jury Could Not Avoid Finding Intent. 
Under the facts of this case, any error in instructing the jury on attempted murder 
based on the "intentional or knowing'' murder alternative is harmless. Intent is seldom 
proved by direct evidence, but is "inferred from the actions of the defendant or from 
surrounding circumstances." State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Utah 1983). In this 
case, defendant's actions demonstrated an unmistakable intent to cause Franz's death. 
During the argument that precipitated the shooting, defendant announced his intention 
to kill Franz, declaring, "F you, bitch. I'Hf ing kill you " R. 232: 141. He then 
pointed the loaded gun at Franz's neck, but stopped short of pulling the trigger when Tiffany 
Ribe intervened. See R. 232: 147, 195, 249-54, 264, 266-70, 276, 279-80, 287. Almost 
immediately after they drove away from the house, defendant again pointed the gun directly 
at Franz's face, but this time pulled the trigger. R. 232: 151, 206-07; see also R. 233: 315-
16,322,363. The gun misfired, failing to discharge. R. 232: 151-53; R. 233: 316; see also 
R. 233: 443-45. When the gun misfired, defendant continued in his attempts. He once again 
put the gun to Franz's face, but before he could pull the trigger, Franz pushed defendant's 
arm into the air and jumped out of the moving truck. R. 232: 152, 208-10, 212; R. 233: 389, 
479-80. As she jumped from the car, the gun discharged. R. 232: 154; R. 233: 317. In all, 
defendant successfully fired the gun at least three times. R. 233: 323-25, 352, 367, 512. 
Under these circumstances, "the jury could not have avoided finding" that it was in 
fact defendant's conscious objective or desire to kill Franz. See Fontana, 680 P.2d at 1048; 
n 
see also Dumas, 721 P.2d at 504-05 (evidence showed intent to kill where defendant 
threatened to kill the victim and took steps to accomplish that purpose).7 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
Respectfully submitted this ZZ> day of February, 2002. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
^ 
:REY S. GRAY 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY Q$tf ERAL 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Defendant has not argued that he did not take a substantial step toward the 
commission of the attempted murder. Indeed, the act of pointing the gun at the victim 
and pulling the trigger, though a misfire, constitutes a substantial step. See People v. 
Files, 632 N.E.2d 1087, 1096 (111. App. 1994); State v. Turner, 587 A.2d 1050, 1053 
(Conn. App.), cert, denied, 591 A.2d 812 (Conn. 1991). 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
Hi Defendant Michael Shawn Casey appeals his convictions of 
attempted murder, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203(1) (a) and 76-4-101 (1999), and aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103 (1999).l Defendant argues he was improperly convicted 
of attempted murder because the jury was not instructed that 
attempted murder requires the "intent" to cause a death. He also 
argues he was improperly convicted of aggravated assault and 
attempted murder because the offenses were based on the same 
conduct. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
<|2 "'We view the facts in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict and recite them accordingly.'" State v. Lopez, 2001 UT 
1. Defendant was also convicted of domestic violence in the 
presence of a child, a third degree felony, in violation of Utar 
Code Ann. § 76-5-109.1 (1999), and received enhanced penalties 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1999), for use of a dangerous 
weapon. He does not appeal the conviction or the enhancements. 
App 123,12, 419 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (citation omitted). In early 
1999, Defendant was romantically involved with Tresa Franz 
(Franz). After drinking alcohol with Terron Allred (Allred) and 
Franz, Defendant drove Allred, Franz, and Franz's son around. 
They eventually stopped to purchase a pint of rum. Defendant 
drank most of the pint and became intoxicated and belligerent 
towards Franz. Franz asked Defendant to take her home, but he 
instead threatened to kill her and drove to a friend's house. At 
the house, Allred left the car to speak with the friend. 
Defendant and Franz began arguing, and Franz asked if he was 
ready to go home. Defendant responded, "Fuck you, bitch. I'm 
going to take you home all right," and pointed a handgun at 
Franz's neck. 
f3 Seeing Defendant point the gun at Franz, the friend told 
them to leave. Defendant put the gun down and agreed to leave. 
As Allred returned to the car, Franz fled into the house. 
However, she returned a few minutes later because she realized 
her son was not with her. After Franz returned, Defendant began 
arguing with her and threatened her again. Hearing the argument, 
the friend's uncle emerged from the house and told them to leave. 
Defendant apologized, backed out of the driveway, and drove away. 
if4 Before they reached the end of the block, Defendant pointed 
the gun at Franz's face and pulled the trigger, but the gun 
misfired. Defendant then shot at Franz's feet, but missed, the 
bullet lodging in the floorboard. Defendant then pushed the gun 
barrel to Franz's head, but before he could pull the trigger, •  
Franz pushed his arm in the air and jumped from the car. As she 
jumped, the gun discharged again. During the ^Ltercation, three 
shots were successfully fired. 
5^ Defendant was charged with attempted murder, aggravated 
assault, domestic violence in the presence of a child, and 
enhanced penalties on each count for using a dangerous weapon. 
The jury convicted Defendant on all counts. Prior to sentencing, 
Defendant's counsel withdrew. Subsequently, appointed counsel 
filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the trial court 
improperly instructed the jury on the mens rea required for 
attempted murder and that the aggravated assault was a lesser 
included offense of the attempted murder. Following a hearing, 
the trial court denied Defendant's motion. Defendant filed this 
appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
16 This appeal presents issues of statutory interpretation. 
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law; 
"[t]herefore, we review the trial court's ruling[s] for 
correctness and give no deference to its conclusions." State v. 
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Viail. 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992); see also State v. Kepoler, 
1999 UT App 89,^4, 976 P.2d 99.2 
ANALYSIS 
I. Was Defendant Properly Convicted of Attempting to 
"Intentionally or Knowingly" Cause Franz's Death? 
f7 Defendant argues that Utah's Criminal Code requires the 
State to prove that he had the "intent" to cause Franz's death. 
Therefore, he argues the jury was improperly instructed that the 
required mental state was "intentionally or knowingly" and his 
conviction must be reversed. 
^8 The attempt statute provides: 
(1) [A] person is guilty of an attempt to 
commit a crime if, acting with the kind 
of culpability otherwise required for 
the commission of the offense, he [or 
she] engages in conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward commission of 
the offense. 
(2) [C]onduct does not constitute a 
substantial step unless it is strongly 
corroborative of the actor's intent to 
commit the offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999). Defendant wa^ charged with 
attempted murder under section 76-5-203(1)(a) of the murder 
statute (the "intentional or knowing" alternative). This section 
2. The State does not argue that we should not consider the mens 
rea or lesser included offense issues because they were not 
preserved for appeal. However, Defendant did not raise these 
issues until his motion for a new trial. Ordinarily the failure 
to timely raise an issue waives that issue. See Utah R. Crim. P. 
12(d). However, when a trial court considers the merits of an 
issue raised in a motion for a new trial, the issue is preserved 
for appeal. See State v. Seale. 353 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993) 
(concluding objection to admission of videotape due to failure to 
comply with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-411 was preserved for appeal 
because trial court addressed merits); State v. Lucero. 866 P.2d 
1, 2 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (concluding objection to 
supplemental jury instruction was preserved for appeal because 
trial court considered and ruled on merits). Although Defendant 
did not raise either issue until his motion for a new trial, the 
trial court considered and ruled on the merits of these issues. 
Therefore, we conclude the issues were preserved for appeal. 
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provides: "Criminal homicide constitutes murder if [a defendant] 
. . . intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a) (1999). 
19 Both parties rely on State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 
1982) and State v. Vigil. 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992). Construing 
the attempt and murder statutes in Maestas, the Utah Supreme 
Court rejected a claim that an attempt to commit first degree 
murder3 requires a mental state greater than "knowing." See 
Maestas, 652 P.2d at 904-05. The court offered two rationales 
for its. decision. First, the court interpreted paragraph one of 
the attempt statute to require "only the kind of culpability 
otherwise required for the commission of the [completed] 
offense." Id. at 904 (alteration in original) (quotations 
omitted). Accordingly, the court concluded that "there [is] no 
difference between the intent required as an element of the crime 
of attempted first degree murder and that required for first 
degree murder." Id. Alternatively, the court explained, even if 
the common law governed, the "intentional or knowing" mental 
state required for first degree murder was sufficient under the 
common law. See id. at 905. 
1l0 Significantly, the jury instructions in Maestas were similar 
to the jury instructions in the present case. They ^described 
the elements of attempted first degree murder and defined the 
terms 'intentionally' and 'knowingly' in precisely the language 
used by the Utah Criminal Code." Id. at 907 (citing Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-103(1)-(2) (1953)). The Maestas court specifically 
noted that the jury "received proper instruction[s] concerning 
the act and intent requirements for the crime oharged." Id. 
flll Subsequently, in Vigil, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
attempted murder under the depraved indifference murder 
alternative in section 76-5-203(1) (c)4 is not a crime. See 
3. In 1991 the Legislature changed "first degree murder" to 
"aggravated murder" and "second degree murder" to "murder." Act 
of 1991, ch. 10, §§ 8-9, 1991 Utah Laws 74, 78-79 (codified as 
amended Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-202 to -203 (1999)). The 
"intentional or knowing" mental states required for aggravated 
murder in section 76-5-202(1) and murder in section 76-5-203 
(1)(a) are identical. See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1160 
n.6 (Utah 1991). Aggravated murder requires aggravating 
circumstances to accompany the mental state. See id. at 1156. 
4. "Criminal homicide constitutes murder if [the defendant] 
. . . acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life engages in conduct which creates a 
grave risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of 
(continued...) 
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Vigil, 842 P.2d at 843-44. The court first noted the mental 
state required to support a depraved indifference murder 
conviction is "knowledge" that conduct "created a grave risk of 
death to another." Id. at 844. The court then rejected the 
Maestas court's interpretation of paragraph one of the attempt 
statute. Paragraph one provides that an attempt occurs when a 
defendant "acts with the 'kind of culpability otherwise 
required'" for the underlying offense. Id. at 845 (quoting Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1)). The court construed that language "to 
refer to the attendant circumstances, if any, of the underlying 
offense." Id. at 845-46 (footnote omitted). 
fl2 The court then construed paragraph two of the attempt 
statute. Paragraph two provides that "the defendant's conduct 
must be corroborative of his or her 'intent to commit the 
offense.'" Id. at 845 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(2)). 
The court concluded paragraph two limits attempts to offenses 
with the mental state of "intent," as defined by section 76-2-
103(1). See id. at 847. Section 76-2-103(1) defines "intent" as 
"'conscious objective or desire.'" Id. (emphasis and citation 
omitted). Accordingly, the court held: 
fTlo convict a defendant of attempted second 
degree murder, the prosecution must prove 
that the defendant had a conscious objective 
or desire to cause the death of another. 
Because the mental state required for 
depraved indifference homicide falls short of 
that intent, the crime of attempted depraved 
indifference homicide does not exist in Utah. 
Id. at 848 (emphasis added). 
1l3 Although in Vigil the court overruled Maestas in part, the 
court explicitly refused to completely overrule Maestas and 
approved the second rationale articulated in Maestas.. 
The first alternative rationale relied on in 
Maestas is clearly inconsistent with . . . 
rstate v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989), 
State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982), and 
State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237 (Utah 1978)] 
and with our holding in the instant case. 
Thus, that portion of Maestas . . . is 
incorrect. However, we note that Maestas is 
still good law insofar as it authorizes 
prosecution for attempted aggravated murder 
4. (...continued) 
another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (c) (1999). 
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under the intentional or knowing formulation 
of section 76-5-202(1) or attempted murder 
under the intentional or knowing formulation 
of section 76-5-203(1)(a). 
Id. at 848 n.5. (emphasis added). Thus, Vigil explicitly allows 
a conviction for a "knowing" mental state under 76-5-203(1) (a), 
which is the section under which Defendant was convicted. 
1Jl4 Defendant argues that following Vigil, attempted murder 
requires the "intent" to cause a death, therefore, the "knowing" 
state of mind in the "intentional or knowing" alternative is 
insufficient. We disagree. The court noted, "The issue before 
us is narrow [,] . . . to determine whether . . . the 'knowing' 
mental state required for depraved indifference homicide under 
section 76-5-203(1) (c) . . . is sufficient to satisfy the mental 
state required by Utah's attempt statute." Id. at 844. If the 
court intended to eliminate attempted "knowing" murders under the 
"intentional or knowing" alternative, instead of writing that 
"Maestas is still good law insofar as it authorizes prosecution 
for . . . attempted murder under the intentional or knowing 
formulation of section 76-5-203(1) (a)," id. at 848 n.5 (emphasis 
added), the court could have simply written that Maestas is still 
good law insofar as it authorizes attempted "intentional" murders 
under section 76-5-203 (1) (a) ,5 
II. Was Defendant Properly Convicted of Aggravated 
Assault and Attempted Murder? 
Kl5 Defendant argues that the aggravated assauit and attempted 
murder should not have been charged as two separate offenses 
because they were one offense in the same criminal episode and 
because the aggravated assault was a lesser included offense of 
the attempted murder. Under section 76-1-402(1): 
5. Following Vigil, Utah appellate courts have stated without 
analysis that the mental state required for an attempted murder 
conviction under the "intentional or knowing" alternative is 
"intent" to cause a death or "knowledge that one's acts would 
result in death if carried out" State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 
642 (Utah 1997) (plurality opinion!, or knowledge that "conduct 
[is] reasonably certain to cause [a] death." State v. White, 880 
P.2d 18, 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also State v. Lemons, 844 
P.2d 378, 381 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (noting required mental 
state is "intent" or "knowledge"); cf. State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 
1150, 1156 (Utah 1991) (noting prior to Vigil mental state 
required is "intent" or "knowledge"); State v. Castonauav, 663 
P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah 1983) (same). 
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A defendant may be prosecuted in a single 
criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; 
however, when the same act of a defendant 
under a single criminal episode shall 
establish offenses which may be punished in 
different ways under different provisions of 
this code, the act shall be punishable under 
only one such provision . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1999). 
116 The clear intent of this section 'is that "[a] defendant may 
not be punished twice for [the same] act." State v. O'Brien, 721 
P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1986). Thus, we must determine if the 
conduct supporting the aggravated assault and attempted murder 
were the "same act." See State v. Mane, 733 P.2d 61, 63 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) . 
117 Utah appellate courts have concluded acts are independent if 
they are in no way necessary to each other or sufficiently 
separated by time and place. See State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 
1239 (Utah 1989) (concluding forcible sexual abuse and forcible 
sodomy supported two counts of aggravated sexual assault because 
they were in no way necessary to each other); 0' Brien, 721 P.2d 
at 897, 900 (concluding defendants who broke into cabin, then 
later pointed guns at owners, threatened to shoot them, held them 
at gun point for several hours, took money from them, and then** 
kidnaped them, were properly sentenced for aggravated burglary, 
aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnaping b^ause the crimes 
were the result of separate and distinct acts); State v. Porter, 
705 P. 2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 1985) (concluding defendant committed 
two separately punishable burglaries when he broke into an 
apartment within twenty minutes of breaking into a laundry room 
in the same "apartment house"). 
118 We conclude the aggravated assault and attempted murder were 
not necessary to each other and were separated by time, place, 
and intervening circumstances. The aggravated assault occurred 
in the driveway. Defendant stated, "Fuck you, bitch. I'm going 
to take you home all right," then pointed a gun at Franz's neck. 
Seeing Defendant point the gun at Franz, the friend told him to 
leave and he put the gun down. Franz then fled the car into the 
house. Clearly, the assault was complete at this point. 
119 Following the assault, Franz remained in the house for a few 
minutes. Franz then returned to the car, and Defendant began 
arguing with her again. The friend's uncle emerged from the 
house and told them to leave. Defendant then backed the car out 
of the driveway. As Defendant drove down the street, he 
committed the separate act of attempting to murder Franz by 
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pointing a gun at her head and pulling the trigger. He then shot 
at her feet and pushed the gun barrel to her head. 
1|20 Clearly, the aggravated assault and attempted murder were in 
no way necessary to each other and were separated by time, place, 
and intervening circumstances. Thus, we conclude section 76-1-
402(1) does not bar Defendant's conviction of both offenses. 
H21 Defendant next argues that the statutory elements, jury 
instructions, and evidence establish that the aggravated assault 
was a lesser included offense of the attempted murder. He 
therefore argues he was improperly convicted of both offenses 
under section 76-1-402(3): 
A defendant may be convicted of an offense 
included in the offense charged but may not 
be convicted of both the offense charged and 
the included offense. An offense is so 
included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same 
or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense 
charged. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999) (emphasis added). 
122 The State concedes, and we assume without deciding, that 
Defendant's conduct while driving involved an aggravated assault 
which merged into an attempted murder. However, the issue in 
this case is not whether Defendant was improperly convicted of a 
lesser included offense based on his conduct while driving. 
Rather, the issue is whether the assault on Franz in the driveway 
followed by the attempted murder while driving down the street 
were separately proved at trial. 
<!23 In State v. Betha. 957 P. 2d 611 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this 
court considered whether aggravated assault was a lesser included 
offense of aggravated burglary. See id. at 617. The evidence 
demonstrated three separate assaults had occurred, two in the 
victim's house and one in the defendant's car. See id. at 619. 
We noted, "While it is true that [the] defendant twice assaulted 
[the victim] during the aggravated burglary, he assaulted her a 
third time after he left the scene of the burglary and was in the 
act of committing aggravated kidnaping." Id. Therefore, we 
concluded, "[T] he elements of aggravated assault were established 
by proof of more than 'all the facts required to establish' the 
aggravated burglary." Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
402(3)(a) (1995)). We then considered "whether the jury was 
properly instructed to find this additional proof." Id. We 
concluded that because the jury was instructed that it had to 
find an additional element to convict the defendant of aggravated 
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assault, that the defendant intentionally caused serious bodily 
injury, under the facts of the case, aggravated assault was not a 
lesser included offense of aggravated burglary. See id. 
1124 Unlike Betha, the aggravated assault in the present case has 
the same elements as the attempted murder, but was based on 
different facts. However, Betha counsels that a jury must be 
instructed appropriately so it does not convict a defendant twice 
on the same facts. See id. To uphold Defendant's conviction, we 
must find that a reasonable jury would have understood that based 
on the instructions, arguments, and evidence at trial, it could 
not convict Defendant of aggravated assault and attempted murder 
based only on the acts in the driveway or only on the acts 
committed while driving down the street. Cf. State v. Ross, 951 
P.2d 236, 245 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
125 Defendant argues the jury was not instructed that it could 
not convict Defendant of aggravated assaulted and attempted 
murder based on the conduct while driving. However, the jury was 
instructed that "[a] separate crime or offense is charged in each 
count of the information. Each charge and the evidence 
pertaining to it should be considered separately." (Emphasis 
added.) 
126 Arguably this instruction sufficiently instructed the jury 
that it could not convict Defendant of aggravated assault and 
attempted murder based on the same evidence.6 Moreover, there.is 
6. The State's arguments make it clear that th£ aggravated 
assault and attempted murder were based on separate conduct. In 
her opening argument the prosecutor stated: 
[Defendant has] been charged with three 
crimes. He's been charged with aggravated 
assault. And that's for pointing a gun at 
[Franz's] head while they were parked behind 
[the friend's] house. He's been charged with 
attempted homicide. And that's for pointing 
a gun at [Franz], pulling the trigger and 
trying to kill her. 
In closing, the prosecutor stated: 
Going in chronological order . . . first of 
all, [Defendant has been] charged with 
aggravated assault. . . . And I submit to 
you that when [Defendant] was at [the 
friend's] house, he pointed a gun at [Franz] 
. . . threatening her with a dangerous 
weapon. That is an aggravated assault. The 
attempted homicide, Count 1. And [Defendant] 
took that gun and he pointed it at [Franz's] 
(continued...) 
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no evidence in the record that Defendant objected to the jury 
instructions at trial or in his motion for a new trial. "[Rjule 
19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that in 
order to preserve an issue involving a jury instruction, the 
objecting party must make an objection in the trial court, 
'stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the around 
of his objection.'" State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1227 (Utah 
1998) (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)). "Accordingly, absent a 
showing of manifest injustice, . . . [we will] refuse to review 
jury instructions to which [a] party did not object in the trial 
court . . . ." Id. Manifest injustice requires that the error 
be "obvious" and "be of sufficient magnitude that it affects the 
substantial rights of a party." Id. at 1226 (quotations and 
citation omitted). Defendant does not argue on appeal that the 
instructions meet either of these requirements. Therefore, his 
lesser included offense argument fails. 
CONCLUSION 
^27 We conclude that the required mental state for attempted 
murder under section 76-5-203(1) (a) is "intent or knowledge," and 
therefore, the jury was appropriately instructed in the present 
case. We also conclude that Defendant's aggravated assault and 
attempted murder convictions were based on independent acts and 
were separately proven at trial. Therefore, we affirm 
Defendant's convictions. 
• 8i4&»f4J 
th M. Billings, Judge 
CONCUR: 
6. . continued) 
head in the car and he pulled the trigger. 
[Defendant] attempted to kill . . . [Franz] 
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